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LABOR AND SMALL BUSINESS - UNIFORMITY OR
CONFUSION
LEMARQUIS DEJARMON *
When this great country was attempting to work its way out of
the throes of the depression, one of the devices used was the granting
of federal recognition to concerted activities for the mutual aid and
protection of the employees.' The labor movement at that time, re-
joicing at this victory, may not have realized that it was also exposed
to the vicissitudes of legislation. 2
Prior to this recognition, with the exception of a few attempts
to apply anti-trust and extortion laws, labor activities had been regu-
lated almost exclusively by the states. The majority of the states
attempted to mould labor problems to the framework of the common
law. When Congress recognized the rights of collective bargaining,
in enacting the Wagner Act, it was hardly anticipated that a Federal-
State problem would emerge. Since Congress had recognized the
right of labor to bargain collectively, labor saw in the recognition a
chance to avoid suits in the state courts. Historically, the employers
had favored the services of state courts for the reason that relief
from unlawful union activities was effective and speedy, in the form
of labor injunctions.3
It was a logical development for labor to contend that the Federal
Acts, by giving recognition to concerted action, had ousted the states
of jurisdiction. In the early days of the Act this argument or con-
tention was usually reserved for removal cases. When an employer
was besieged with a labor problem and applied to the state court for
injunctive relief, as has been done frequently in the past, the union
would move to have the case removed to the Federal Court. The
main contention was that the Federal Act had pre-empted the field
of labor relations as it affects commerce and thus had ousted the state
courts of jurisdiction.; Thus, once the case was removed to the Fed-
* Associate Professor of Law, North Carolina College at Durham, A.B. 1939,
Howard University; LL.B. 1948, Western Reserve University.
1 § 7 of NIRA, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). This section fell when the NIRA was
declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
The idea was expanded in 49 Stat. 449 (1936), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958) and 61 Stat.
34 (1947), 29 USC § 141 (1958).
2
 As the pattern has emerged Congress has taken major action in the field of
labor management at 12 year intervals.
3 Petro and Koretz, Labor Relations Law, 1953 Ann. Survey Am. L. 265, 266.
4 Assoc. Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Castle and Cooke Terminals v. Local 137 ILWU, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Haw. 1953),
Overton v. IBT, 115 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
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eral Courts, it would be dismissed because the Federal Courts could
not enforce the proscription of the Federal Act in a private suit, or
at least, its power to grant injunctive relief was statutorily limited
to the granting of enforcement to orders of the NLRB.'
The unions had some measure of success with this theory, in
fact over the years the concept of pre-emption has grown to such
proportions that Congress has had to get into the area again. The
much litigated case of the San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,6
 has carried the concept of pre-emption to a new extreme,
where some activities of labor are not amenable to common law tort
law of the state. The Garmon case carried the trend of other cases'
to exclude state courts in damages as well as injunctions.
It is the purpose of this paper to comment on the recent decision
and the changes it has prompted in labor legislation.
The Garmon brothers operated a small retail business and were
approached by the union to sign an agreement with it to retain in
their employ only those workers who were already members of the
union or who would apply for membership within thirty days. The
Garmons refused to sign such agreement claiming that it would be
violations of the Federal Labor Acts. 8
 The Union began to picket
the business. The company sued in the state court for injunction
and damages for losses sustained as a result of the picketing. While
this action was pending the employer began representation proceedings
before the NLRB, but the Board declined jurisdiction on grounds
that the amount of interstate commerce involved did not meet the
Board's standards for taking jurisdiction. In view of the Board's
refusal to take the case, the state courts felt that it had jurisdiction
to act,9
 therefore issued the injunction and awarded damages. On
5 Amazon Cotton Mill v. TWIT, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
359 U.S. 236 (1959). The case has been in the courts for a number of years.
For history of case see 273 P.2d 686 (Calif. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1954); 45 Cal. 2d 657,
291 P.2d 1 (1955) ; 351 U.S. 923 (1956) ; 353 U.S. 26 (1957) ; 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d
473 (1958).
7 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Guss v. Utah Labor Board,
353 U.S. 1 (1957).
Union agreement clauses are permissible under LMRA if union is collective bar-
gaining agent—in this case it was not. State court constantly referred to this agreement
as a closed shop agreement which was illegal under LMRA.
9 The Board had announced a rule that retail stores should have annual direct
imports of $1,000,000 or indirect imports of $2,000,000. The Garmons in previous
years had sold materials, originating and manufactured outside of the State, of a value
exceeding $250,000.
Indeed when the Board revised its jurisdictional limit upward (originally it had
been lower than $1,000,000 direct and $2,000,000 indirect), it was generally thought
that this would leave a larger area for state control.
See Dissenting Opinion in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957),
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first hearing before the Supreme Court, the judgment as to the in-
junction was reversed on the grounds that the Federal Act had pre-
empted the field. The second time before the Supreme Court the
concept was applied to the damages, when the basis of the state
court action was that the picketing constituted a tort under State
law."
This decision seems to have gone practically the whole distance
in ousting the states of jurisdiction over labor activities in industry
affecting commerce, unless the Board had ceded jurisdiction pursuant
to Section 10(a) of the Act. 11 In the absence of such agreement the
states would lack the power to furnish a remedy under their own law
for non-violent tortious conduct which is not federally protected, but
is federally prohibited.
The broad language of the majority opinion would place the
small employer in a hiatus for judicial relief from any activity of the
union which could be "arguably subject" to either Section 7 or Section
8 of the Act.
It is the Labor Board alone which has the power to determine
that the activity complained of is "arguably subject" to the Act.12
Until the Board has specifically shown, by rule or decision or strong
(a companion to the principal case on its first hearing before the Supreme Court)
in which Justice Burton states: "The Board does not 'cede' jurisdiction when it declines
to exercise its full jurisdiction; it merely allows the States to exercise their pre-existing
authority." (18)
10 The Union Placard read:
"A F of L Picket
Millman Union 2020
Teamster Union 36
Invites employees to join"
The State Court found that the picketing was not for the purpose of educating the
workers and to persuade them to become members, (activity protected by § 7 of
LMRA) but was for the sole purpose of putting pressure on customers and suppliers
to prevent them from dealing with the firm until it had signed the agreement (activities
prohibited by § 8(b) LMRA and state law).
11 § 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides: "That the Board is empowered by
agreement with any agency of any state or territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction
over all cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing communication and
transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases
may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or
territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is
inconsistent with the corresponding provision of the Act, or has received a construction
inconsistent therewith."
12 359 U.S. 236, 244-245. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "At times it is not clear
whether a particular activity is regulated by Section 7 or 8 or was perhaps outside
both of these Sections. But Courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues.
It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the
first instance to the NLRB. What is without the scope of this Court's authority cannot
remain within a states' power and states' jurisdiction too, must yield to the exclusive
primary competence of the Board (Citing other cases)." (Parenthetical material added.)
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precedent that the activity is not within the Act, i.e., neither protected
nor prohibited, the state courts are powerless to act.
The Plumbers v. County of Door" case demonstrates this most
vividly. A municipal corporation of Wisconsin entered into a contract
with several contractors to erect a new courthouse for Door County.
One of the contractors, a successful bidder, hired nonunion labor.
The Union, on facts parallel to the Gannon case, picketed the em-
ployer and the courthouse. In the action before the state court it was
argued that the County of Door as a subdivision of the State govern-
ment was expressly exempted from the Federal Act, thus State law
was not pre-empted, therefore the state court could give effective
relief. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, in
reversing the State Court, said:
"We do not, of course, attempt to decide whether the unions'
conduct in dispute violates Section 8(b) 4, is protected by
Section 7 or is covered by neither provisions of the labor
Act. Those are questions for the Board to determine in a
proper proceeding brought before it."
Thus it appears that until the Board has decided that the activity
is not arguably subject to the Act, or is not protected and is not
prohibited by the Act, both State and Federal Courts must "defer to
the exclusive competence of the NLRB if the danger of conflict is
to be averted."
This was the status of things when Congress decided to step into
the labor picture again." Although most of the authorities in the
field of labor relations agree that the cases discussed above created
an intolerable situation which could only lead to the frustration of
the policy of the Labor Management legislation, there is some ques-
tion, at least to the author, whether Section 701(a) and (b) is the best
solution. Indeed, I suspect that this section may be productive of
much mischief.
What the new Act accomplishes in this area can be summarized
as follows:
(1) Board may decline jurisdiction over labor dispute by
rule of decision or by published rules, but it cannot
decline jurisdiction over any dispute over which the
Board would have exercised control as of August 1,
1959.
13 Plumbers, etc. Local 298 AF of L v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 decided
May 4, 1959.
14 See § 701(a) Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959.
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(2) The cases rejected by the Board may be handled by
the States.
It is apparent that the new Act, at the least, gives the states a
hand in the labor field, where the Garman case has held that they
had none, but how much of a hand it gives is still undetermined and
unknown. The language of the new Act sets only the minimum stand-
ard for the acceptance of jurisdiction. The Board cannot raise its
dollar value standard of jurisdiction from that of August 1, 1959,
but there seems to be nothing that would prevent the Board from
reducing the dollar value standard. The Board, if budgetary consid-
eration would permit, could increase its jurisdiction to the full extent
of that given by Congress, but if this is impossible, then the states
may accept the cases declined by the Board.
It may well be that the Congress thought that this section would
have either of two possible results, namely:
(a) That the states realizing that they now have a part
to play in the area of labor management relations which
have some effect on commerce, will enact legislation
which would create state machinery which would pro-
vide means for effectuating the policy of the NLRA as
amended, or
(b) That the Labor Board, realizing that a segment of com-
merce would be exposed to a hodge-podge of state
regulations, and varied state court equity decrees, would
be compelled to exercise the full statutory jurisdiction
and accept every case.'
If the latter is the true purpose of this section, then considered
in the light of the Board's present case load16 and its long delay in
processing the cases, this result may lead to administrative chaos.
Suppose because of budgetary and other considerations the Board
does not exercise its full statutory authority. The question then arises
upon whom rests the power to make the initial determination as to
15 See Senate Labor Committee's Report No. 187, 86th Congress, 1st Session. The
Committee in discussing this section as originally proposed indicated that it desired
the result. This also seems to be the import of the discussion between Senator Kennedy
and Senator Carroll. Senate Rep. 9-3-59 p. 16416, ff.
Even though the Supreme Court has held that the Board may decline to bring
unfair labor practice action, it bad not decided that the Board may decline jurisdiction
in a representation proceeding. Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) and
Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958). These cases did not reach the question
of Board authority to decline jurisdiction, but merely found that to refuse a whole
industry as a class was to exercise its discretion in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.
113 Under present jurisdictional standards the Board processed about 13,000 cases a
year and its present time lag for disposing of eases is about two years.
179
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
whether the Board will accept jurisdiction. In Carolina Supplies and
Cement Company," the Board noted the amount of time and personnel
required to conduct the examination necessary to determine inflow
and outflow figures for the purpose of jurisdiction. If the Board is to
continue to make this determination, then it is possible for the Board
to devote much of its time and personnel examining inflow and outflow
figures, direct and indirect, only to have this effort productive of
nothing other than a declination of jurisdiction.
In such an instance the parties could then start in the state courts
or state boards. This is a lot of wasted motion adding nothing to the
cause of industrial peace. On the other hand, if the states are to make
the initial determination, by what standards are the states to be guided
in a particular case where the employer contends that the Board
could not take jurisdiction under its announced rules and the Union
contends that it could take jurisdiction? Further, what dollar volume
is to be considered—the dollar volume at the time the cause of action
arose, which may be within the Board's announced rule, or the dollar
volume at the time of the suit, which because of the effect of activity
complained of, may be below the Board's standards? It would appear
to be an unusually harsh rule to require an employer whose business
is increasing to be held answerable, at the time of action, for the
conduct or activity done at the time he was not amenable to the act,
or conversely to compel an employer whose business is declining, to
comply with a nonexistent duty to bargain in the future.
The new Act also permits the Board to decline jurisdiction over
"any class or category of employers" by decision or rule. The language
of the Garmon case taken in conjunction with Section 9 (c) ( I ) and (2)
of Taft-Hartley Act, may require a prior resort to the NLRB for a
determination of the question of whether the conduct complained of
is "arguably subject" to the protection or prohibition of the Federal
Act.
Section 9(c) requires the Board to process representation suits,
where a question of representation exists. In the two cases' which
have been before the Supreme Court in which the Board declined
jurisdiction even though there existed a representation question, the
court reversed the Board and directed the Board to consider the
representation petition. 19 It would appear that in a particular case
involving an employer in a certain class or category, the Board may
17 122 N.L.R.B. 17, 43 L.R.R.M. 1060 (1958).
18 Office Employees v. NLRB, and Hotel Employees v. Leedom, note 15 supra.
19 The Board has now announced that it will exercise jurisdiction over hotels that
do a gross annual business of $500,000.00. It still declines jurisdiction over residential
hotels in which 75% of the guests reside by the month.
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still have to make a prior decision on the conduct complained of,
before the state court could come in and grant relief.'
The jurisdictional standards set by the Board are limitations on
the Board proceedings rather than on the factual situation. This is
best illustrated by looking at a concrete, though hypothetical fact
situation.
Suppose a labor union approaches an employer for recognition
as the exclusive bargaining agent. The union claims that the majority
of the workers are sympathetic and will join the union. The company
refuses to deal with the union, claiming that the state has a "right
to work" law. At this time the company volume of business is below
the standard set by the Board. The union begins to picket the
employer. The company discharges all the known union sympathizers
from its employment, and applies to the state court for relief. The
state does not have a labor code as such, so under its common law
rules the court awards damages and also issues an injunction against
"stranger picketing." Now suppose the Board, as it may well do,
revises its jurisdictional standards so as to include the business of
the company. Can the union now petition the Board on the grounds
that the company's business was always of such nature as to affect
commerce and that the Federal Act was always applicable and there-
fore, there should be a citation for unfair labor practices, and rein-
statement of the employees wrongfully discharged?' It would seem
that the Union should be successful in this type of action, because
Section 701 of the LMRDA which gave the state courts power to act
was only a limitation on the Board proceedings, not a limitation on the
fact situation. Now since the limitation on the proceedings is removed
20 Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Rela-
tions, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 6 (1959).
21 It seems that even § 14(b) of Taft-Hartley Act would be of little or no aid in
that this section only prohibits the making of union shop agreements under the Federal
Act when the agreement would be illegal under state law. Here the objectives of the
union would be protected by the Taft-Hartley Act, except for limitation of jurisdictional
standards. Further, as long as the picketing remained peaceful and the business had some
effect on interstate commerce, although not enough to warrant NLRB action, stranger
picketing could not be enjoined by the state.
See Teamster Union v. Voight, 354 U.S. 284, 294, 295 (1957) where majority held:
"the mere fact that there is picketing does not automatically justify its restraint without
an investigation into its conduct and purposes. State courts no more than state legis-
latures can enact blanket prohibitions against picketing."
Although the Voight case involved intra-state business and state law against picket-
ing to coerce the employer to put pressure on his employees to join a union, the United
States Supreme Court expressly recognized the declared congressional policy to the same
effect. Thus, it appears now where Congressional policy is involved, both State
and Federal courts must defer to the Board.
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the Board should be free to act under the Federal law which was tech-
nically applicable all the time.
Even if this obstacle is overcome, the question of what law is
applicable is still a very formidable problem. The California court
in the two Garman cases tried both federal and state law. First, it
applied the federal law because the business had some effect on com-
merce and was within the statutory jurisdiction of the Board and there-
fore should be entitled to the uniformity of treatment which the fed-
eral law afforded. Next the California court applied state law; as
discussed above the court rejected on appeal. If Section 701 of
the new act permits the courts of the states to apply their own law,
then the employer and employees of these marginal industries are
subjected to a hodge-podge of inadequate state rules. 22
Although the Garner, Guss, Garman line of decisions created an
intolerable situation as far as labor-management relations are con-
cerned, it is doubtful whether the 1959 Act has done more than
substitute a new set of difficulties for an old set of difficulties.
It may be suggested that the 1959 legislation, like the legislation
of 1947, was enacted in a climate which was not conducive to wholly
objective considerations. The congressional disclosure of racketeering
in the labor movement and the possibility that the "no man's land"
of the three "G" cases provided a fertile field for such activities, may
have created a desire for providing an immediate forum to which
employers or unions may appeal for relief. But the time may now
be at hand for Congress to take a long, clear, objective look at the
entire field of labor management relations, rather than to continue to
react to certain known evils with piecemeal legislation every twelve
years.
Certainly labor management relations and industrial peace are
too important in this day of speed and modern technology for even
these marginal industries to be left to the devices of state courts deal-
ing with common law tools which were not designed for the job to be
done. We must recognize that industrial relations are a specialized
field which require specialized and expert handling. This problem of
FederaI-State control and jurisdiction may be resolved more equitably
by the creation of a United States Labor Court organized somewhat
along the lines of the United States Tax Court. The Labor Court
could be organized in divisions with each division sitting in various
sections of the country.
22 Thirty-eight of fifty states have no labor relations administrative agency.
In these states the Superior Courts and Courts of Common Pleas would have to handle
these labor disputes with the tools of the common law. Since the common law did not
guarantee any labor rights as such, the results are, at best, unpredictable.
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Labor problems affecting commerce, where Boards have declined
jurisdiction and irreparable harm is threatened, could be carried to
the Labor Court where both labor and management would have assur-
ances of some uniformity of application of Federal law.
The Labor Court could also relieve the Federal Circuit Courts
of the limitations of mere enforcement of Labor Board decrees. Al-
though this proposal would add another step to the Federal Judicial
process, it is felt that the certainty of uniform application of Federal
Law to this vital area is preferable to the possibility of small business
being exposed to the uncertainty of 50 different state laws, and the
possibility of still being subject to Federal litigation.
The 1959 Act, Section 701(b) apparently recognized the neces-
sity or desirability for such legislation, in that it provided for dele-
gation of Board duties to three or more members as well as delegation
to regional directors. But the author feels that the creation of a Labor
Court would be more efficient and could perform in a larger and
wider area in the labor-management field.
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